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The Meaning of Adverse Employment Actions in the 
Context of Title VII Retaliation Claims 
Michael Rusie* 
INTRODUCTION 
Retaliation is a distinct and independent cause of action that arises 
under section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.1 The 
action provides redress to employees who are “discriminated” against 
at work, not for their membership in a protected class, but for either 
their involvement in a protected activity or their opposition to 
unlawful discrimination.2 Due to the statutory ambiguity of what 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2002. 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).  
Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in 
enforcement proceedings. It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an 
employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship 
or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate 
against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member 
thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this Subchapter, or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this Subchapter. 
Id. 
 2. The two areas of protection under the retaliation provision are commonly known as 
the opposition clause and the participation clause. Generally, the participation clause protects 
workers who initiate or cooperate in legal investigations or hearings based on discrimination in 
the workplace. Similarly, the opposition clause protects employees who openly express their 
concerns about workplace discrimination directed towards either the individual himself, or his 
co-workers, but which may or may not take on a legal form. The legal proceeding brought by an 
employee protected by the participation clause need not be meritorious, and the opposition to an 
employer’s alleged discriminatory practices need only be based on reasonable belief. See 
Edward T. Ellis and Paula Zimmerman, Current Developments in Employment Law: 
Retaliation Claims, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, Feb. 3-5, 2000, at 881, 884-85. 
379 
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constitutes “discrimination” in the retaliation context,3 courts have 
judicially constructed the elements for a prima facie case of Title VII 
retaliation.4 One of these elements is some retaliatory act by an 
employer that constitutes an “adverse employment action.” Currently, 
the circuits are split as to which employer actions are included in the 
definition of this judicially created term of art.5 This Note examines 
the different constructions of “adverse employment actions” in the 
context of Title VII retaliation claims.6 
In Ray v. Henderson,7 the Ninth Circuit held that “adverse 
employment action” encompassed all “adverse treatment reasonably 
likely to deter an employee from engaging in the protected activity.”8 
When it adopted this standard, the court stated that it chose to define 
“adverse employment action” broadly.9  
When it took the broad view of adverse employment actions in 
Henderson, the Ninth Circuit joined the First, Seventh, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits in the current three-way circuit split on 
this issue.10 The Second and Third Circuits articulated a middle-
 
 3. The co-managers of the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “entered an 
interpretive memorandum into the Congressional Record” that defined discrimination, in a 
general sense as follows: “to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor.” 
Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in Requiring 
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove That the Employer’s Action Was Materially 
Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333, 373-74 (1999) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7213 
(1964)).  
 4. See, e.g., Smalley v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1981) (listing the 
requirements that plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case as: (1) statutorily protected 
expression; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected 
expression and the adverse action). More recent cases replaced “protected expression” in 
element 1 with “protected activity” to cover cases under both the opposition and participation 
clause. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 5. This Note discusses the split as a three-way divide. It should be noted, however, that 
some courts and commentators discuss the split as a two-way split. See Margery Corbin Eddy, 
Note, Finding the Appropriate Standard for Employer Liability in Title VII Retaliation Cases: 
An Examination of the Applicability of Sexual Harassment Paradigms, 63 ALB. L. REV. 361 
(1999) (characterizing the split as two-way). This depends on how one interprets the vague 
language often used to describe an “adverse employment action.” 
 6. As opposed to its application in retaliation provisions of other discrimination statutes 
or in other provisions of Title VII, like section 703. 
 7. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 1240. 
 10. See Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994) (adverse employment actions 
(AEA) “include demotions, disadvantageous transfers . . . , and refusals to promote”); Knox v. 
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ground construction of adverse employment action in requiring the 
alleged retaliatory acts to be “materially adverse.”11 The Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits take the most restrictive view and require the 
retaliatory action to be an “ultimate employment decision” before it 
rises to the level of an adverse employment action.12  
This Note demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit, despite a 
reasonable basis for its decision, took a view that leaves employers 
too vulnerable to retaliation claims.13 Furthermore, this Note argues 
that courts should adopt the “materially adverse” requirement 
articulated by the Second and Third Circuits.14 Courts will provide 
sufficient remedial protection to employees, while shielding 
employers from trivial or otherwise inconsequential claims.15  
Part I of this Note briefly documents the history of Title VII 
retaliation and the court cases that carved out the parameters of the 
prima facie case of retaliation.16 Part II outlines recent cases that 
 
Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996) (AEA includes transfer to worse office and deprivation of 
support services); Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996) (AEA 
includes making employee go through extra “hoops” to get severance benefits); Berry v. 
Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996) (AEA includes malicious prosecution); 
Wideman v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1998) (AEA includes denying 
lunch break, one-day suspension, and changing schedule); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y, 935 
F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (AEA includes canceling public event in honor of aggrieved 
employee). 
 11. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997) (AEA must be 
action that alters compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 
625 (2d Cir. 1997) (AEA must be a materially adverse change in terms and conditions of 
employment). 
 12. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997); Ledergerber v. 
Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 13. “Retaliation” for the rest of this Note will refer strictly to the Title VII retaliation 
claims; if another discrimination statute’s retaliation provision is mentioned the author will so 
indicate. 
 14. See generally Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997); Torres v. 
Pisano, 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997). Some courts may use “materially adverse” language in the 
opinion without really taking the intermediate position in the circuit split that this language 
suggests. See Ledergerber, 122 F.3d at 1144 (adopts “ultimate employment decision” test but 
also says that actions must have “effectuated a material change in the terms or conditions of 
[plaintiff’s] employment”).  
 15. In using the terms “trivial” and “inconsequential,” the author does not mean to belittle 
legitimate claims to differential treatment based on involvement in a protected activity, but 
rather to classify discrimination based on relative severity to make a judgment as to which 
levels of discrimination should be cognizable under Title VII. 
 16. Title VII’s retaliation provision has very little legislative history. Section 703 of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, which deals with discrimination based on membership in a protected 
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construe “adverse employment action” and the standards developed 
by those courts that form the basis of the current circuit split.17 Part 
III analyzes these cases and the history of the conflict to illuminate 
the problems with the Ninth Circuit’s standard.18 Part IV proposes 
that courts adopt the “materially adverse” standard to prevent a 
proliferation of retaliation claims by employees who seek to redress 
only trivial “discrimination” in the workplace.19  
I. HISTORY OF TITLE VII RETALIATION AND THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
The cause of action for employer-perpetrated retaliation20 in the 
workplace originated in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.21 As 
opposed to causes of action based on section 703(a) of Title VII,22 
Congress meant the retaliation provision to protect any employee,23 
 
group, has received much more attention. Therefore, this section will focus primarily on the 
case law that developed the contours of this cause of action. 
 17. “Adverse employment action” is not a statutorily created term that courts have to 
construe, but rather a judicially created one. The retaliation provision only refers to 
“discrimination.” See Lidge, supra note 3; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(2) (1994). 
 18. The Ninth Circuit is joined in its broad stance by the First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, 
and D.C. Circuits. See supra note 10. Although these circuits advocate a “broad” view of 
adverse employment action, their articulation of this view is not always the same. This Note 
groups the circuits this way for comparison purposes. 
 19. Although no circuit explicitly advocates “trivial” discrimination as cognizable under 
Title VII per se, this term is value laden and relative. The term’s application varies based on 
one’s viewpoint and its relationship to other types of discrimination. In this author’s opinion, 
the broader view (of AEA) opens the door to litigation over minor matters that in some 
instances can be considered “trivial.” It should also be noted that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recognizes that “petty slights and trivial annoyances are not 
actionable.” EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 6512 (Ronald Miller & Joanne Boy eds., 1999). 
 20. Although most cases and this Note generally deal with retaliation perpetrated directly 
by the employer to the employee, some cases suggest that retaliation at the hands of co-
employees can be cognizable in some instances. See Knox, 93 F.3d at 1333 (an employer who is 
aware of retaliation by co-employees and does not take action can be held liable); see also 
Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that “co-
worker hostility or retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute ‘adverse 
employment action’ for purposes of a retaliation claim”). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). It is unlawful, inter alia, “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” Id. 
 
 23. The Supreme Court extended this protection to former employees as well. Robinson v. 
Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (holding the term “employee” in the Title VII retaliation 
provision to include former employees). Robinson involved a man who filed an EEOC charge 
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regardless of membership in a protected class,24 from discrimination 
based on opposition to employer practices25 or participation in a 
protected activity.26  
Title VII’s retaliation provision, although clearly not the 
predominant focus of Title VII, is essential to the protections 
afforded by Title VII.27 The purpose of Title VII is to protect the 
employee who utilizes the remedial measures granted by Congress to 
protect his or her rights under its other provisions.28 In section 704(a), 
Congress struck the balance in favor of employees when it weighed 
the competing interests of employers’ need to protect their reputation 
against unwarranted discrimination complaints with employees’ need 
to protect their rights to make such complaints.29 
Congress’ subsequent enactment of similar retaliation provisions, 
in recent discrimination statutes, reflects the importance of Title VII’s 
retaliation provision in the protection of employee rights.30 Since 
 
after being fired for allegedly discriminatory reasons that formed the basis of his EEOC claim. 
Robinson was subsequently given a poor reference by his former employee while in the process 
of seeking a new job. 
 24. Protected classes under Title VII are listed in section 703. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
They include members of any racial classification, religious group, nationality, or gender. 
Membership in a protected class has significance in deciding who can bring a suit for disparate 
impact or disparate treatment in any given situation. For example, a man could not bring a 
disparate impact claim against his employer for actions that have a discriminatory impact on 
female workers at his place of employment. Only a woman could bring a claim in this instance, 
because the protected class is female employees.  
 25. See supra note 2 (describing the “opposition clause”). The “opposition” is typically 
discrimination based on section 703. 
 26. See supra note 2 (describing the “participation clause”). This is typically participation 
in a hearing related to discrimination based on section 703. 
 27. The major source of debate and discussion in the Act’s legislative history involved the 
protections provided by section 703(a). See generally EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES 
VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1966). Also, most litigation that surrounds Title VII 
is grounded in the protections afforded in section 703(a). Indeed, by their very nature, 
retaliation claims are based on underlying alleged violations of section 703(a).  
 28. In Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1969), 
the court states that “[t]here can be no doubt about the purpose of § 704(a). In unmistakable 
language it is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his 
rights.” Id. 
 29. Id. at 1007.  
 30. One commentator suggested that if a statute does not contain a retaliation provision, 
an aggrieved employee may still find protection under a generic retaliation provision in 42 
U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1994). This provision reads, in part:  
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, 
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from 
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enactment of Title VII, Congress inserted parallel provisions into the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,31 the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,32 the Equal Pay Act of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act,33 and the Family Medical Leave Act.34  
Due to the ambiguities present in the retaliation provision of Title 
VII and these subsequent statutes, courts are left to develop the 
specific contours of the prima facie case for retaliatory 
discrimination.35 Courts that face this challenge almost universally 
adopt a three part test: (1) employee involvement in a protected 
activity;36 (2) an adverse employment action against the employee;37 
and (3) a causal link between (1) and (2).38 The second part of this 
three-part test, the adverse employment action, is the most 
contentious.39 The high level of contention that surrounds this 
 
attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein . . . the party so 
injured or deprived may have an action for recovery of damages, occasioned by such 
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 
Ellis, supra note 2, at 883 n.1. 
 31. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000). 
 32. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2000). 
 33. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000). 
 34. The Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2000). 
 35. The ambiguity refers to the use of the word “discrimination” in the retaliation 
provision. It can be argued that this word is not ambiguous and should be used in any standard 
of liability. Cf. Lidge, supra note 3, at 340 (advocating “discriminatory employment action” 
instead). This author believes, however, that even if the word has a plain meaning on its face, it 
is ambiguous with regard to its application in the retaliation context. Congress surely did not 
intend for courts to apply strict and mechanically the term “discrimination,” which is a very 
broad term, because that would dictate liability even in the most “trivial” of circumstances. See 
supra note 19. 
 36. This factor implicates either the opposition or participation clauses. See supra note 2. 
 37. After Robinson v. Shell Oil, this factor can also include former employees. See 
Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 38. For an example of an enunciation of this three-part test, see Corneveaux v. CUNA 
Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996). Once courts determine that the plaintiff 
facially established the prima facie case of retaliation, they invoke a burden-shifting approach 
announced in the Supreme Court case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973). Although the McDonnell case did not involve a retaliation claim, its burden-shifting 
approach as applied in a disparate treatment context has been almost universally applied to 
retaliation claims as well. A Ninth Circuit case enunciated the burden shifting approach in a 
retaliation context as follows: “If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
the defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action.’ The 
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the asserted reason is pretextual.” Ellis, 
supra note 2, at 886-87 (quoting Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 39. For the opposite view, see MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
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element of the prima facie case is evident in the current divide in the 
federal circuits as to the appropriate boundaries of “adverse 
employment action.” 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The circuit split over the “construction”40 of adverse employment 
action roughly breaks down into three categories.41 First, some 
circuits define this element narrowly and find liability only for 
“ultimate employment actions” taken in retaliation for involvement in 
protected activities.42 Other circuits take an intermediate position and 
find liability only where the action was “materially adverse.”43 
Finally, a majority of circuits find broad liability even in situations 
that fall below a materially adverse threshold.44 
A. The Narrow View 
The minority of circuits find retaliation liability only where the 
employer’s action entails an “ultimate employment action.”45 Courts 
have held that ultimate employment actions include hiring, firing, 
demotions, promotions, and compensation. 
The Fourth Circuit, in Page v. Bolger,46 first articulated the 
ultimate employment standard in a case that did not involve a Title 
VII retaliation claim.47 In Page, a black postal employee alleged 
discrimination when his employer repeatedly denied him a 
 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 305 (2d ed. 1988) (“The second element, adverse effect, poses 
no peculiar problems for retaliation law; as with section 703(a), the only question is whether the 
employee was treated differently from employees who did not engage in protected conduct. The 
third element, causation, is the most difficult.”). 
 40. Construction refers to the interpretation of the judicially created term “adverse 
employment action,” rather than to construe a statute. See supra note 17. 
 41. See supra note 5. 
 42. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 43. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 44. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 45. See infra text accompanying notes 52 and 65. 
 46. 645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
 47. Although this case did not involve a retaliation claim, the decision’s effect on future 
retaliation cases in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits is clear. In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak, 104 
F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), discussed in the following text, the court cites Page for the 
proposition that only ultimate employment decisions are actionable. Id. at 708. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p379 note Rusie book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
386 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:379 
 
supervisory position.48 Page brought his action under section 717 of 
Title VII for disparate treatment of a federal employee.49 The court 
held that the disparate treatment theory of Title VII typically focuses 
on discrimination that involves ultimate employment decisions.50 
Page’s articulation of the threshold of liability in disparate 
treatment cases subsequently formed the analytical basis used by 
courts that hear Title VII retaliation cases and adopt a narrow view of 
“adverse employment action.”51 In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,52 
the Fifth Circuit took exactly this position.53 Mattern, a mechanic in 
Eastman Kodak’s mechanic’s apprenticeship program alleged sexual 
harassment by members of her on-the-job training crew. After she 
filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge 
for harassment, Mattern received poor evaluations from her 
supervisor, had her locker broken into, and experienced hostility from 
her co-workers.54 Mattern subsequently brought an action for hostile 
work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation.55 The 
 
 48. Page came up for promotions on three separate occasions. Each time the decision to 
promote was in the hands of three white employees, who collectively denied Page a promotion 
on each occasion, choosing a white employee instead. 645 F.2d at 229. 
 49. Id. at 227; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16a (1996). Section 717 of 
this Act applies to employees of the federal government. Subsection (a), entitled 
“Discrimination Prohibited,” provides, in part, “All personnel actions affecting employees or 
applicants for employment . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 50. 645 F.2d at 233 (saying that courts have “consistently focused on the question whether 
there has been discrimination in what could be characterized as ultimate employment decisions 
such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating”). 
 51. These cases involve a situation where a person is treated differently by her employer 
because of her race, sex, nationality, or religion. The private cause of action for disparate 
treatment is found in section 703 provisions of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 52. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 53. Id. at 707-09. The position that only “ultimate employment decisions” can constitute 
an adverse employment action. The Fifth Circuit has stuck with its view in subsequent cases, 
and appears to be the primary supporter of this position. See Burger v. Central Apt. 
Management, 168 F.3d 875, 878-80 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that denial of a lateral transfer 
with the same job duties, wages, and benefits did not constitute an “ultimate employment 
decision”); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title VII is 
designed to protect employees from ultimate employment decisions and not every decision that 
might have some tangible effect on the employee). 
 54. 104 F.3d at 705-06. The Court also points out that Mattern failed a couple “major 
skills tests” at the same time and cites this as a possible reason for her missed pay increase and 
her slow progress in the apprenticeship program. Id. at 709. 
 55. Id. at 704. Mattern’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claim and her 
constructive discharge action failed at the trial level. Id. The jury found that although Mattern 
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court held for the defendant on the retaliation claim,56 stating: “Title 
VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to 
address every decision made by employers that arguably might have 
some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.”57 
Mattern defined ultimate employment decisions58 to include such 
decisions as hiring, firing, granting leave, discharging, promoting, 
and compensating.59 The court further stated that hostility by co-
workers did not constitute an adverse employment action60 and, in 
general, Mattern could only prove “examples of many interlocutory 
or mediate decisions having no immediate effect upon employment 
decisions.”61 The court held that the only action which Mattern could 
identify as a sufficiently adverse employment action was a missed 
pay increase.62 Despite this fact, the court dismissed this claim 
because, inter alia, Mattern could not prove the increase would have 
taken effect before she resigned.63 Thus, the Mattern decision carved 
out the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive view of adverse employment action 
 
was harassed by her co-workers, her employer took immediate remedial action. Id. The jury did 
find for Mattern on the retaliation claim, however, and awarded her $50,000 in damages. Id. 
The jury was instructed, in part, as follows: “Now, adverse employment action could be defined 
as a discharge, a demotion, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, reprimand, [or] acts of sabotage 
. . . .” Id. at 707.  
 56. Id. at 703. The Appeals Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion 
for a judgment as a matter of law following the jury verdict. Id. 
 57. Id. at 707 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 58. Id. The court did not address competing conceptions of the standard for adverse 
employment decision, but rather assumed that “ultimate employment decision” was the only 
standard. Id. Indeed, the court states, in the opening line of the opinion, that, “The linchpin for 
this appeal is what constitutes an ‘ultimate employment decision’ as required for a retaliation 
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id. at 703. 
 59. Id. at 707. 
 60. Id. Other courts have taken the opposite view and held that hostility by co-workers 
can constitute retaliation. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 61. Id. at 708 (quoting in part from Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233) (4th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc)). The dissenting opinion in Mattern, written by Justice Dennis, strongly admonishes the 
majority for relying in part on rationale from the Page decision. Id. at 716-17. The dissent 
claims that the majority mistakenly reads the Page decision to limit the scope of Title VII 
discrimination liability, when in fact nothing in the opinion or Title VII suggests such an 
interpretation. Id. at 717. 
 62. Id. at 709. 
 63. Id. The court cites two other reasons as support for dismissal of Mattern’s retaliation 
claim. First, they argued that there was evidence that Mattern was not qualified for the job in 
the major skills tests she failed. Id. Second, the court noted a general lack of evidence for all her 
claims of retaliatory acts. Id. 
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by allowing only a narrow avenue of redress to employees retaliated 
against in the workplace. 
The Eighth Circuit in Ledergerber v. Stangler,64 took a similar 
approach to the Fifth Circuit,65 and held that an employee’s 
allegations were insufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation because the court did not consider the action an ultimate 
employment decision.66 The employee who brought the suit, Diane 
Ledergerber, was a white income maintenance supervisor for the 
Division of Family Services of the Missouri Department of Social 
Services. Ledergerber alleged that she was discriminated against on 
account of her race and that she was subsequently retaliated against 
for opposing the department’s policy of deference to black 
employees.67 The alleged retaliatory acts included: replacement of her 
office staff with personnel transferred in from another office. In 
addition, she retained the same position and title in her office, and a 
negative statement was placed in her employee file.68 
The Court found that Ledergerber’s allegations if true, had only a 
“tangential effect” in this case.69 The Court followed Fifth Circuit 
 
 64. 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 65. Id. at 1144. The Court’s decision was similar, but not entirely consistent with Mattern 
because of the fact that the Ledergerber court used both “ultimate employment decision” and 
“materially adverse” language in its opinion. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 66. Id. at 1144 (stating that the action “did not rise to the level of an ultimate employment 
decision intended to be actionable under Title VII.”). 
 67. Id. at 1143-44. Ironically, Ledergerber’s motives to file her claims of harassment and 
retaliation were retaliatory. In 1993, sixteen black co-worker’s alleged that the office 
Ledergerber worked in discriminated against them based on race. This initial complaint did not 
include specific charges against Ledergerber. Later that same year, however, three more black 
employees came forward with a new complaint that alleged that Ledergerber retaliated against 
them for participating in the original discrimination complaint. Following this second charge, 
the Department of Social Service (DSS) director, also defendant, Gary Stangler, determined that 
the office’s hiring practices were flawed and that two of the six allegations of retaliation at the 
hands of Ledergerber were substantiated. Id. In response, Stangler recommended changes in the 
office’s hiring practices and corrective action against Ledergerber. Id. The corrective action that 
ensued transferred out the caseworkers in Ledergerber’s office and transferred in other 
caseworkers from another division, ostensibly to avoid personal clashes, and placing a notice in 
Ledergerber’s employee file that discriminatory practices would not be tolerated. This action is 
the point at which Ledergerber brought her suit for racial discrimination and retaliation. Id. at 
1143. 
 68. See supra text accompanying note 64. The statement placed in Ledergerber’s file was 
arguably not negative, because it did not mention wrongdoing on the part of Ledergerber and 
was similarly placed in the files of co-workers. 122 F.3d at 1145. 
 69. Id. at 1144. 
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precedent70 and appeared to utilize two distinct standards to 
determine the threshold for an adverse employment action.71 The 
Court said that in order to make out a prima facie case, an employee 
needed to show a “materially significant disadvantage.”72 Thus, the 
Court seemed to walk the line between adopting the most restrictive 
view, that of the “ultimate employment decision,” and the more 
intermediate position of a materially adverse action.  
B. The Intermediate View—Materially Adverse Action 
At least three federal circuits, the Second, Third, and Fourth, 
employ a lower threshold of liability than the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits, and have adopted a materially adverse requirement.73 This 
standard includes actions that fall short of ultimate employment 
decisions, but which nonetheless require relatively significant 
consequences to the employee before liability attaches. 
 
 70. Id. The court follows, in part, the precedent of Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
37 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994) (using “materially significant disadvantage language”). 122 F.3d at 
1144. The dissent criticizes the majority for what it deems to be a mis-read of Harlston, saying, 
“I do not believe, however, that Harlston stands for the proposition that an employer can avoid 
Title VII liability by characterizing all changes in duties as qualitative and, therefore, non-
adverse.” Id. at 1145. In addition, the dissent questions the majority’s application of the 
materially adverse requirement, saying, “I cannot accept the premise that being identified as a 
racist by one’s employer ‘cause[s] no materially significant disadvantage.’” Id. (quoting 
Harlston, 37 F.3d at 382).  
 71. Id. at 1144-45. The court uses both the “materially adverse” standard and the 
“ultimate employment decision” standard. See supra text accompanying notes 14 and 62. 
 72. Id. at 1144 (quoting Harlston in saying “changes in duties or working conditions that 
cause no materially significant disadvantage . . . are insufficient to establish the adverse conduct 
required to make a prima facie case”).  
 73. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 
F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997); and Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 
1997). The case that initially introduced the adverse requirement was Spring v. Sheboygan Area 
School Dist., 865 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1989). Although Spring did not involve a retaliation claim, 
numerous subsequent cases that deal with retaliation utilize its articulation of “materially 
adverse employment action.” See Lidge, supra note 3, at 350-51. Since Spring, it seems that the 
Seventh Circuit remains in a state of confusion as to the standard for adverse employment 
actions. Compare Knox v. State of Indiana, 93 F.3d. 1327, 1334 (taking an exceptionally broad 
view of adverse employment action to include moving an employee to a less desirable office 
and to deprive her of previously available support services), with Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 
F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1996) (taking a narrower view that an unfavorable employment 
evaluation is insufficient by itself to trigger Title VII retaliation liability), with Rabinovitz v. 
Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996) (taking middle ground in adopting “materially adverse” 
requirement). 
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The Third Circuit adopted this middle-of-the-road approach in 
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh.74 In Robinson, a female police officer 
accused her supervisors of sexual harassment and retaliation.75 Once 
the officer filed a charge with the EEOC, she allegedly received a 
reassignment, an oral reprimand, and derogatory comments.76 At the 
trial level, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment with respect to the retaliation claim.77 The court claimed 
that Robinson failed to prove the third requirement in a prima facie 
case of retaliation: the causal link between the alleged adverse acts 
and her participation in an EEOC claim.78  
The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of 
Robinson’s retaliation claim and agreed that Robinson did not prove 
a causal link. The court added that her claim also failed because the 
alleged adverse acts committed by her employer did not constitute 
adverse employment actions.79 The court established that, “retaliatory 
conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . .”80 
 
 74. 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 75. Id. at 1292. Robinson complained of both hostile work environment and quid pro quo 
sexual harassment. Id. 
 76. Unlike most cases that involve a transfer in the retaliation context, Robinson alleged 
that a failure to transfer constituted the adverse employment action. Robinson claims that her 
employment forced her to continue to work under the supervisor against whom she lodged her 
sexual harassment claim. Id. at 1300. Ultimately, both the trial and appellate courts found that 
many of these alleged acts of reprisal occurred before Robinson filed her EEOC charge, and 
thus did not constitute retaliation. Id. at 1301. 
 77. The court dismissed all three retaliation claims brought by Robinson, two against 
individual supervisors and one against the city. Id. at 1292. 
 78. Id.; see ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 39 (stating that the causation element of retaliation 
claim is hardest to prove). 
 79. 120 F.3d at 1300-01. Although the Robinson court does not impose a “materially 
adverse” requirement, the court implicitly takes this intermediate position in its language and in 
the cases it cites to support its position. The court quotes McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256 
(7th Cir. 1996), a case that utilizes the materially adverse standard, and interprets it to say that 
this standard “‘is a paraphrase of Title VII’s basic prohibition against employment 
discrimination, found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2).’” 120 F.3d at 1300-01 (quoting 
McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 258). Likewise, the court cites Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 
F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996), another case that adopts the materially adverse position. 120 F.3d 
at 1300-01; see also Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, 162 F.3d 778, 787 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(following the Robinson decision and citing it for the proposition that the term “discrimination” 
equates with “materially adverse employment action”). 
 80. 120 F.3d at 1300. Again, the language used by the court, i.e. “tangible” and “serious,” 
practically imposes a standard very similar to a “materially adverse” requirement. Although, 
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In accordance with the court’s view that the test for adverse 
employment action arises from the same principles that govern 
disparate treatment under section 703 of the Civil Rights Act,81 the 
court said that retaliatory conduct is generally to be proscribed if it: 
(1) alters compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment; (2) deprives the employee of an employment 
opportunity; or (3) adversely affects the status of the employee.82 The 
court then added the general disclaimer that “not everything that 
makes an employee unhappy qualifies as retaliation . . . .”83 Thus, like 
most courts that addressed this issue, the Robinson court made it clear 
that trivial effects on one’s employment situation will not give rise to 
a retaliation claim. 
Similar to the approach taken in Robinson, the Second Circuit 
adopted the intermediate standard of “materially adverse change” in 
Torres v. Pisano.84 In Torres, the plaintiff alleged both racial and 
sexual discrimination under Title VII.85 After the plaintiff filed an 
EEOC charge based on these claims, she alleged that two of her 
supervisors retaliated by telling her to drop the charges.86 The trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the 
 
courts use language from the disparate treatment provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), section 
703 of the Civil Rights Act, to adopt the broad view, the court’s opinion rejects this view. This 
rejection is evident from the cases the court cites and the court’s strong feeling that only truly 
serious actions will trigger liability. See supra text accompanying note 79 for the court’s 
position. The court states that, “‘not everything that makes an employee unhappy’ qualifies as 
retaliation, for ‘[o]therwise, minor and even trivial employment actions that ‘an irritable, chip-
on-the-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.’” Id. at 
1300 (quoting Williams, 85 F.3d at 274)). 
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 22 and 78. 
 82. 120 F.3d at 1300. 
 83. Id. at 1300 (quoting Smart, 89 F.3d at 441). 
 84. 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997). Although much of the Torres decision focuses on an 
issue tangential to the present topic, the court’s decision is nonetheless important in that it 
makes a clear stand for the “materially adverse” standard. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t 
of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999) (interpreting Torres to hold that “a plaintiff 
may suffer an ‘adverse employment action’ if she endures a ‘materially adverse change in the 
terms and conditions of employment’”). 
 85. Torres was a Puerto Rican woman employed by New York University as a secretary 
in the Dental Center. Her supervisor, Eugene Coe, made sexually disparaging remarks and 
called her a “dumb spic” and other racially-charged nicknames. 116 F.3d at 628. 
 86. Id. at 629. Two supervisory officials in the school administration allegedly intimidated 
Torres. Id. 
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Second Circuit affirmed.87 
The Second Circuit held that Torres failed to prove a “materially 
adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.”88 The 
court said that although she was possibly intimidated and frightened, 
these actions did not meet the standard, because nothing changed in 
her employment situation.89 “‘Reasonable defensive measures,’” as 
the court described them, “‘do not violate the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII, even though such steps are adverse to the 
charging employee’ . . . so long as they ‘do not affect the 
complainant’s work, working conditions, or compensation.’”90 The 
court noted in dicta, however, that repeated attempts to demand a 
withdrawal of charges could constitute adverse employment actions 
in some cases, provided that the pressure from these demands altered 
the conditions of employment.91 Thus, the Second Circuit seemed to 
advocate the materially adverse standard in Torres and acknowledged 
that liability rests not on the specific act committed by the employer, 
but the effect this act has on the employment conditions of the 
aggrieved employee.92 
 
 87. Id. at 641. 
 88. Id. at 640 (quoting McKenney v. N.Y. City Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F. Supp. 
619, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
 89. 116 F.3d at 640. In fact, as the court points out, Torres’ job conditions actually 
improved after she complained to supervisory personnel and filed her EEOC charge. Her 
immediate supervisor and the alleged harasser, Coe, were fired while Torres received a transfer 
and a substantial raise. Id. 
 90. Id. (quoting United States v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 97 F.3d 672, 677 (2d Cir. 
1996)). Presumably, when the court uses the term “reasonable defensive measures” it refers to 
actions like the one in this case, i.e. to request that an employee drop the charges. 
 91. 116 F.3d at 640. The court adds,  
For instance, repeated and forceful demands accompanied even by veiled suggestions 
that failure to comply would lead to termination, discipline, unpleasant assignments or 
the like, might in some circumstances affect an employee’s working conditions. But 
here Torres admits that Heller and Pisano did not repeat their requests, that she in fact 
refused their requests, and that she suffered no negative consequences as a result of 
having turned them down. 
Id.  
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
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C. The Broad View  
The First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits take a 
broad view of what constitutes an adverse employment action and 
place more emphasis on the employer’s motive than on the effect of 
the employment action.93 In addition, the EEOC explicitly adopted 
this approach and explicitly rejected both the ultimate employment 
decision test and the materially adverse test.94 Although the broad 
approach is articulated in various ways, all courts that adopt this 
position give considerable remedial affect to Title VII’s retaliation 
provision.  
In Ray v. Henderson,95 the Ninth Circuit sided with the EEOC to 
hold that, “an adverse employment action is adverse treatment that is 
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in a protected 
activity.”96 Ray, a postal carrier for twenty-eight years, brought suit 
when his employer allegedly retaliated against him for opposing 
gender bias and harassment against female co-workers.97 The alleged 
acts of retaliation included: the elimination of employee meetings, the 
cancellation of the post office’s policy of flexible start times, the 
 
 93. See supra text accompanying note 10 (discussing only the Ray and Passer cases).  
 94. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 19. The EEOC Compliance Manual 
contains a section entitled, “Adverse Actions Need Not Qualify as ‘Ultimate Employment 
Actions’ or Materially Affect the Terms and Conditions of Employment to Constitute 
Retaliation.” Id. The Manual says that these two opposing standards are “unduly restrictive” 
and “[t]he statutory retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment that is based on a 
retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging 
in protected activity.” Id. In further support of its position, the EEOC notes that no qualifiers 
attach to the word discrimination in section 704, and thus coverage was intended for “any 
discrimination.” Id. at 6513. The EEOC also suggests that the Supreme Court may endorse the 
broad approach in that it has held that the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision was to 
“[m]aintain[] unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Id. (quoting Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. at 346). 
 95. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 96. Id. at 1237. This is almost a direct quote from the EEOC Compliance Manual. See 
supra note 94.  
 97. Supra text accompanying note 95, at 1237. Ray’s claim here fell under both the 
opposition and participation clauses. He initially opposed his employer’s alleged discrimination 
of female co-workers through verbal complaints at employee meetings and written letters. Id. 
Later, after he himself began to experience a hostile work environment, Ray requested EEOC 
counseling. Id. at 1238. Ray claimed he suffered retaliatory acts both after he opposed 
discrimination by his employer and then again after he participated in an EEOC counseling 
request on behalf of himself and his co-workers. 
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institution to a “lockdown” during the day, and the reduction of Ray’s 
salary.98 
After the Ray Court addressed and chronicled the circuit split on 
this issue, it announced that the Ninth Circuit defines adverse 
employment action broadly.99 The court adopted the EEOC approach 
and noted that the standard focused on deterrent effects and 
discrimination rather than ultimate effects and the level of severity 
involved.100 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the broad standard 
was consistent with both prior case law and the language and purpose 
of Title VII.101  
 
 98. Id. at 1238-39, 1243-44. After Ray initially wrote a letter to complain of the 
harassment of women in his office to one of the top supervisors, Ray’s immediate supervisor 
consistently berated him publicly and threatened to change his policy of “self-management.” Id. 
at 1237-38. Ultimately, the supervisor did cancel employee meetings and mandated that 
employees come in at 7:00 a.m., rather than 6:00 a.m. as Ray was accustomed to, which gave 
the carriers less time to sort their mail. Id. Also, Ray was personally singled out for harassment; 
he was falsely charged with misconduct and subjected to numerous pranks. Id. at 1238. In 
response to these episodes, Ray filed his first formal complaint with the EEOC. Id. It was after 
this complaint that Ray and his co-workers were subject to “lockdown,” by which they were 
required to ring a bell and wait for a fellow employee to let them in each time they went in and 
out of the post office. Id. at 1238-39. This process considerably increased the time it took for 
the carriers to complete their jobs. Ray complained again to the EEOC on three more occasions, 
only to have his route cut in size, thereby reducing his salary by approximately $3,000. Id. at 
1239. 
 99. Id. at 1240-41. The court, like this Note, characterizes the circuit split as a three-way 
split. Id. at 1240. The court took the broad position and followed circuit precedents citing cases 
in support thereof. See Strother v. Southern California Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 
869 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “mere ostracism does not constitute an adverse employment 
action,” but a lateral transfer does); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that “transfers of job duties and undeserved performance ratings, if proven, would 
constitute adverse employment action”); St. John v. Employment Dev. Dept., 642 F.2d 273, 274 
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that transfer to another job of the same pay and status may constitute 
an AEA); Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that dissemination 
of an unfavorable job reference was an AEA “because it was a “personnel action” motivated by 
retaliatory animus”). Id. at 1241. 
 100. Id. at 1243. The court quotes from Hashimoto, 118 F.3d at 676, when it states that 
“the severity of an action’s ultimate impact (such as loss of pay or status) ‘goes to the issue of 
damages, not liability.’” Id.  
 101. Id. at 1243. To reason that their position is consistent with the language of Title VII, 
the court looked to the word “discrimination” within the statute and noted that it contains no 
qualifiers. 217 F.3d at 1243. Thus, the court reasoned, “[t]his provision does not limit what type 
of discrimination is covered, nor does it prescribe a minimum level of severity for actionable 
discrimination.” Id. In support of this position, the court quotes Passer as saying: “The statute 
itself proscribes “discrimination” against those who invoke the Act’s protections; the statute 
does not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take the form of cognizable employment 
actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion . . . .” Id. (citing Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y, 
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Like the Ray court, the D.C. Circuit chose to adopt a broad 
standard of liability in the context of retaliation claims. In Passer v. 
American Chemical Society,102 the D.C. Circuit addressed a 
retaliation claim based on the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act.103 The ADEA contains a virtually identical retaliation provision 
as the one found in Title VII.104 The Passer case involved a 
distinguished director in the American Chemical Society (ACS) who 
was forced to retire upon reaching the age of seventy.105 Passer did 
not want to end his career that early, so he filed an age discrimination 
claim shortly before his employment expired.106 After Passer filed his 
claim, the ACS cancelled a planned symposium in his honor.107 
 
935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 10 and 100. 
 102. 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991). For Title VII retaliation cases in the D.C. Circuit that 
follow the lead of Passer, see Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Passer to 
advocate a broad definition of adverse employment action); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 499 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Passer throughout and noting that ADEA and Title VII retaliation cases 
often utilize same standard of conduct). 
 103. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any 
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or 
applicant for membership, because such individual, member or applicant for 
membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such 
individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this 
Act. 
Id. 
 104. See Passer, 935 F.2d at 330. Because the ADEA has an almost identical retaliation 
provision, Title VII cases are often used to analyze ADEA retaliation cases and vice versa. Id. 
See also Brown, 199 F.3d at 456.  
 105. See Passer, 935 F.2d at 324. Passer was made to retire pursuant to an internal policy 
of the American Chemical Society (ACS). Id. He was to retire in January 1987, the exact month 
the ADEA took effect. Id. As of January 1, 1987 employers could no longer enforce mandatory 
retirement policies. Id. However, the ACS argued that Passer’s situation fell within a narrow 
exception to the ADEA because he could be classified as a “bona fide executive.” Id. Thus, the 
ACS denied Passer’s request based on their assumption that they would be exempt from the 
ADEA in this particular situation. Id. As it turned out, this assumption was incorrect and the 
court reversed the District Court’s motion of summary judgment for defendant on the age 
discrimination issue. Id. at 332.  
 106. Id. at 324. 
 107. Id. at 325. Passer filed his complaint in February 1987, a week after he was forced to 
retire. Id. at 324-35. The symposium, to be held at the annual membership meeting in April 
1987, was cancelled the day before the event was to take place. Id. at 325. Both parties 
acknowledge that the symposium was to be a “rare and prestigious” laurel for Passer and that it 
was “one of the highest honors that could have been bestowed upon him by his peers.” Id.  
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Passer claimed that the cancellation constituted a retaliatory act in 
violation of the ADEA’s anti-retaliation provision.108 
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
retaliation complaint. The court explicitly rejected the ultimate 
employment decision standard and implicitly joined those circuits 
taking a broad view in the circuit split when it chose an “adverse 
impact” approach.109 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Broad View Is Inadequate to Protect Employers’ Interests 
The expansive view of Title VII’s retaliation provision, recently 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Ray v. Henderson is too broad in its 
application of “adverse employment action.”110 Congress 
undoubtedly intended Title VII as remedial legislation.111 The courts 
that employ this standard, however, expand liability to employers for 
actions beyond the scope of the statutory language of section 704.112 
 
 108. Id. In fact, ACS did not challenge that the cancellation of the symposium was in 
retaliation for Passer’s age discrimination complaint. Id. at 330. The ACS, however, argued that 
the retaliation provision was inapplicable because: (1) the alleged retaliatory action occurred 
when Passer was no longer an “employee” of ACS; and (2) the penalty imposed by ACS did 
not rise to the level of the adverse action proscribed by the statute. Id. at 330. 
 109. Id. at 331-32. The court stated: “[T]he statute does not limit its reach only to acts of 
retaliation that take the form of cognizable employment actions such as discharge, transfer, or 
demotion.” Id. With regards to the claim that “employment action” could not include actions 
against former employees, the court said, “[I]t is well established that efforts by an employer to 
scuttle a former employee’s search for a new job, such as by withholding a letter of 
recommendation or by providing negative information to a prospective employer, can constitute 
illegal retaliation within the meaning of ADEA and parallel antiretaliation provisions.” Id. at 
331. This quote is of interest because it was written six years before Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 
where the Supreme Court that held the term “employees” in the Title VII retaliation provision 
to include former employees. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 110. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 111. See supra note 27. Clearly, courts must give the statute remedial significance to give 
the retaliation section any meaning. Without a meaningful retaliation provision, the remedial 
effect of section 703 would likewise be hampered, because employees would be cautious to 
exercise their rights under that section.  
 112. Section 703 outlaws “[d]iscrimination for making charges, testifying . . . .” See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). In this author’s view, the term “discrimination” as used in this 
provision is ambiguous. The language fails to help see the threshold intended by Congress for 
an unlawful retaliation. See supra note 19. Indeed, with very little legislative history on this 
matter, the intentions of Congress are left to speculation. At one extreme, it seems obvious that 
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Use of this standard can lead to liability for “trivial” acts of alleged 
retaliation.113 Accordingly, employers are faced with a vague, 
subjective, and amorphous standard that fails to consider businesses’ 
legitimate interest to plan their activities in accordance with federal 
employment laws.114  
The potential for liability that stems from trivial employment 
actions is evident from the language of opinions that advocate the 
broad position. The most recent case, Ray v. Henderson,115 recited the 
language of the EEOC Compliance Manual116 and declared: “In our 
circuit an adverse employment action is adverse treatment that is 
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected 
activity.”117 On its face, this holding appears somewhat innocuous, 
seeming to advocate a substantiality requirement to the “adverse 
 
Congress did not intend a strict application of the word “discrimination” in the retaliation 
context. This lack of intent follows from the unique nature of a retaliation claim. In a retaliation 
case, as opposed to one that involves a section 703 claim, the employee is often still employed 
by the very employer they sue in federal court. This situation lends itself to an inevitable 
awkwardness in the workplace. Congress plainly wanted to insure, through section 704, that 
employees could remain in their job while “participating” or “opposing” their employers’ 
actions without enduring harassment. It also, however, seems likely that Congress would have 
recognized the unique nature of this situation and therefore, would not have advocated liability 
for minor acts of “discrimination” towards the employee that files suit against the employer. For 
example, a transfer to a different office or department is necessary to insure productivity and to 
separate acrimonious employees who no longer get along due to matters related to the lawsuit. 
Likewise, it would not seem as though systematic shunning of an employee by implicated 
fellow employees, provided it is not at the direction of management, would constitute 
compensable discrimination under section 704. In other words, it seems obvious that Congress 
wanted to protect an employee’s legitimate interest to remain in the same job with the same 
benefits, but it does not follow that Congress intended to mandate harmonious relations in the 
workplace following the filing of a Title VII suit.  
 113. See supra note 15. 
 114. First, the broad view provides a vague, amorphous standard by which it only requires 
employees to show the employment action was “adverse.” This “standard” begs the question of 
“How adverse?” To cancel a symposium that honors an employee is surely “adverse” to that 
employee, but it does not logically follow that such an action should trigger liability for the 
employer under federal anti-discrimination laws. Second, this amorphous standard is highly 
fact-sensitive and thus provides no guidance to employers about the level of “discrimination” 
that constitutes retaliation. Employers are not able to adequately educate their employees on 
what constitutes retaliation, nor are they able to effectively monitor employee behavior in this 
regard.  
 115. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 116. See supra text accompanying note 10. In fact, the Ray holding explicitly adopts the 
EEOC position and quotes directly from the EEOC Compliance Manual.  
 117. 217 F.3d at 1242-43. 
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employment action.”118 Looking more closely at the opinion, it is 
quite evident that the Ray Court advocates a much broader 
application than its holding suggests.119 The court cites with approval 
decisions from other circuits that found “adverse employment 
actions” from, among other things, cancelled lunch breaks,120 
deprivation of support services,121 and the creation of “several hoops” 
for the employee to obtain her severance payments.122 The broad 
view the court announced imprudently expanded the scope of Title 
VII’s retaliation provision.123 
Like the Ninth Circuit in Ray, the D.C. Circuit in Passer v. 
American Chemical Society124 defined the term “adverse employment 
action” too liberally in its holding.125 In fact, the court did not go 
beyond the face of the judicially constructed “adverse employment 
action”126 and merely proscribed a test of “any conduct having an 
 
 118. One would think this holding would add a substantiality requirement to “adverse 
employment action” because “reasonably likely to deter” seems to rule out a wide range of 
minor matters. Such minor issues probably would not deter a determined employee from 
standing up for their rights or the rights of a co-worker. In other words, an employee who was 
discriminated against, and then decides to take the difficult step to oppose such discrimination 
is not likely to withdraw her opposition, e.g. after having her office moved to a less desirable 
location. In fact, one could assume that such a determined employee will become more resilient 
in her quest to be vindicated when she is further “discriminated” against in this relatively minor 
way. In consideration of this premise, the “reasonably likely to deter” standard comes awfully 
close to the materially adverse standard adopted by other circuits.  
 119. This position is shown, in part, by the Ray Court’s explicit adoption of the EEOC 
position. See supra note 19. The EEOC’s elaboration on its “reasonably likely to deter” 
standard suggests that the EEOC’s actual position is broader than their standard suggests. If the 
Ray court did indeed adopt the EEOC’s position, then it can also be inferred that it adopted the 
more elaborate reasoning as well.  
 120. Wideman v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1998) (the 
employee was made to work on her day off without a lunch break after she allegedly skipped a 
day of work). 
 121. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (the employee was moved to a 
worse office and deprived of challenging work). 
 122. Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 123. Due to the facts of the Ray case, it is very plausible that a court that employ the 
“materially adverse” standard would reach the same ultimate conclusion. The employee in this 
case, in this author’s opinion, suffered from unlawful retaliation for opposing his employer’s 
practices and for participating in an EEOC investigation.  
 124. 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
 125. Again, although this case involved an ADEA claim rather than a Title VII cause of 
action, the Passer court acknowledged the identical nature of the two provisions by using Title 
VII retaliation cases to interpret the ADEA’s retaliation provision. Id. at 330. 
 126. See supra note 17. 
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adverse impact of plaintiff.”127 In its application of this overly-broad 
and vague standard, the court found liability when an employer 
canceled a symposium that honored the plaintiff-employee. The 
cancellation occurred after the employee filed an age discrimination 
claim against the employer.128 The employer admitted the 
cancellation and argued that the action was nonetheless justified by 
“legal prudence” and not an act of retaliation.129 Indeed, one would 
not suppose that an employer would want to continue financially 
sponsoring a symposium that honors an outgoing employee while 
simultaneously having that employee drag the employer into court for 
an expensive round of litigation.130 The D.C. Circuit turns a blind eye 
to common sense when it suggests that an employer remains 
obligated to continue to provide extra-occupational benefits to an 
employee who files federal discrimination charges against his 
employer.131 The retaliation provision of Title VII132 requires 
employers to refrain from unlawful discrimination in the form of 
retaliatory actions. The provision does not require the employer to 
positively reinforce an employee who seeks to expose that employer 
to liability in federal court.133 
 
 127. 935 F.2d at 331. The court announced its standard and explicitly rejected the “ultimate 
employment decision” test: “[T]he statute does not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that 
take the form of cognizable employment actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion.” Id. 
The court does not address the “materially adverse” standard.  
 128. Id. at 330. 
 129. Id. This “legal prudence” argument is not outlined in any detail in the case. One could 
understand, however, why an employer would want to avoid “honoring” an employee whom the 
employer attempts to oust through mandatory retirement. Passer argued that he could still 
function effectively in his former directorship despite his age. A symposium “honoring” Passer 
could provide factual credence to his argument, and actually help Passer’s case.  
 130. This does not suggest that the cancellation of the symposium was meaningless to 
Passer. Indeed, ACS cancelled the event a day before it was to occur, undoubtedly causing 
embarrassment to Passer. Id. at 324. 
 131. A situation may exist where an employer could be liable for retaliation after it 
withdraws an extra-occupational benefit. This situation requires a very significant reliance on 
interest and/or potential malice on the part of the employer. From the facts of this case, neither 
is present.  
 132. Of course, in this case it was the ADEA retaliation provision.  
 133. This provision is not to say that an employer should not encourage employees to seek 
remedial help for discrimination in the workplace or provide channels for redress. It is simply to 
suggest that once the case gets to federal court, the parties become adversaries. While the 
employer cannot and should not retaliate, he/she cannot be expected to reinforce the employee’s 
position.  
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B. The Narrow View is Too Restrictive and Fails to Give Remedial 
Affect to Section 704 
While the broad view of Title VII’s retaliation provision allows 
for litigation over trivial matters of discrimination, the restrictive 
view, which adheres to the ultimate employment action test, fails to 
provide adequate protection to employees seeking to exercise their 
rights under Title VII.134 The circuits that employ this test allow too 
much latitude to employers to retaliate against employees in ways 
that are not as easily cognizable as a hiring, firing, or demotion.135 
Limiting the definition of retaliation to these ultimate decisions is 
antithetical to the purposes of section 704.136 If the goal of section 
704 was to ensure “unfettered access”137 to the remedial mechanisms 
of Title VII, then employers should not have at their disposal a wide 
range of retaliatory tactics short of ultimate decisions that could deter 
employees from exercising their rights.138  
While Ledergerber v. Stangler139 presents an example of the 
restrictive view’s potential for injustice, the language of the Eighth 
Circuit is nonetheless instructive.140 Unfortunately, for the purposes 
 
 134. The test fails to protect workers in two respects. First, the test fails to give workers 
adequate protection from retaliation to make it worthwhile to engage in opposition to employer 
actions or to participate in an EEOC investigation. Second, even if the test does not prevent an 
employee to take part in a protected activity, it still fails to provide employees an adequate 
remedy for retaliation beyond the remedy available through the underlying Title VII complaint.  
 135. Examples of such less cognizable retaliatory acts include transfers that result in 
substantially worse working conditions for the employee and significant reductions in 
responsibility. See Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 136. The Supreme Court said that Congress’ purpose in creating the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII was to “maintain unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
 137. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
 138. This statement may sound similar to the EEOC’s stance on actions that might 
reasonably deter an employee to bring a claim. While the phrase is compelling as a framework 
for a standard of retaliation, this author does not intend to advocate the EEOC’s broad position 
to employ these words. In other words, this author believes that while the language of the 
EEOC’s standard is appealing, the EEOC’s explanation of how this standard should play out in 
practice is not appealing.  
 139. 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 140. This case is a bad example of the injustice that can result from application of the 
narrow view because the plaintiff in Ledergerber did not present a very strong case. Id. at 1144. 
The court correctly decided the case based on the facts, and a court that applies any of the three 
tests discussed in this Note would have likely ruled against the plaintiff here.  
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of this analysis, the court mixes the use of the “materially adverse” 
and “ultimate employment decision” tests.141 Whether the court 
intended to take a strict “ultimate employment decision” stance is 
unclear, however, its use of this term of art is troubling. With a more 
confounded set of facts than were present here, the court may have 
made a stronger case for the more intermediate, more pro-employee 
position of “materially adverse action.”142 As it stands, the 
Ledergerber court unfortunately leaves a precedent in the Circuit to 
find actionable retaliation only when there is a hiring, firing, or 
demotion involved.143  
More troubling than the Ledergerber decision, is the Fifth 
Circuit’s position in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak.144 The Mattern 
Court did not even mention the possibility of using a barometer of 
liability other than the ultimate employment action test. The court 
assumed away this position in the opening line of the opinion.145 As a 
consequence, the Mattern decision is a more “pure” application of the 
ultimate employment test than Ledergerber.146 The court seemed to 
focus primarily on the lack of consequence to the employee charging 
the alleged retaliation.147 The court’s perception of what constituted a 
 
 141. Id. at 1144 (finding no adverse employment action because the actions had not 
“effectuated a material change in the terms or conditions of her employment,” and alternatively 
holding that the actions, “did not rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision”). 
 142. If the court was presented with a more sympathetic plaintiff with a stronger case, the 
court may have been more inclined to use only the more lenient position of “materially adverse 
action.” In fact, the dissent uses this standard. Id. at 1145. 
 143. Id. at 1144. 
 144. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 145. Id. at 703 (“The linchpin for this appeal is what constitutes an ‘ultimate employment 
decision’ as required for a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”). 
 146. This comment is in reference to the Ledergerber decision’s mixed use of “ultimate 
employment decision” and “materially adverse employment action.” In contrast to the 
confusing standards in Ledergerber, the Mattern court is consistent in its use of the “ultimate 
employment decision.” See, e.g., id. at 708. 
 147. Id. (“The other events, such as the visit to Mattern’s home, the verbal threat of being 
fired, the reprimand for not being at her assigned station, a missed pay increase, and being 
placed on ‘final warning,’ do not constitute ‘adverse employment actions’ because of their lack 
of consequence.”). This statement by the Mattern court clearly illustrates the court’s intention to 
take a strict “ultimate employment decision” approach. The court suggests in this quote that 
intermediate actions taken against an employee cannot constitute adverse employment actions 
even if they occur frequently. This approach has the potential for substantial injustice and tips 
the balance in litigation to those employers whose “retaliatory” acts fall just short of ultimate 
decisions.  
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“consequence” to the employee is instructive.148 The court did not 
find that theft of items from the employee’s locker, systematic 
hostility from fellow employees, and the lack of a potential pay 
increase had any immediate effect on the employee, simply because 
these actions did not result in the firing or demotion of the 
employee.149 As a result of this characterization, the court could 
easily dismiss the employee’s significant emotional distress and 
property loss as “tangential” to any ultimate decisions.150  
Armed with the predetermined test of “ultimate employment 
decision” the Mattern Court justified their holding with reference to 
Title VII’s definition of discrimination.151 This definition utilizes the 
Title VII catchphrase of “compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment” as the bounds of Title VII 
discrimination.152 In other words, Title VII considers these factors as 
part of an unlawful “discrimination” for the purposes of the statute.153 
Surely, Ms. Mattern, while subjected to widespread hostility and 
harassment in the workplace, could be said to have been 
discriminated against with regard to the conditions of her 
employment after taking part in a protected activity.154 The Mattern 
 
 148. The court’s idea of what constituted a consequence to the employee is instructive to 
understand the court’s holding.  
 149. Id. at 707-08; see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). The court 
did, however, acknowledge that the missed pay increase could have constituted retaliation, but 
that Mattern failed to prove the increase would have taken effect before she resigned. Id. at 709. 
 150. 104 F.3d at 708. According to the court, employer actions do not constitute “adverse 
employment actions” if they are “tangential” to future decisions, and that Mattern “could only 
prove examples of the many interloctory or mediate decisions having no immediate effect upon 
employment decisions.” Id. (quoting Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc)). 
 151. Id. (remarking that “[o]bviously, this reading [the court’s reading of section 704] is 
grounded in the language of Title VII”). The court then quotes directly from Title VII’s 
definition of discrimination. Id. at 708-09 (quoting from 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1)). 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 153. Thus, treating somebody differently for the purposes of employment decisions based 
on any of the classifications enumerated, i.e. race, national origin, sex, is unlawful 
“discrimination” for Title VII purposes. 
 
 154. If we accept the Mattern court’s notion that we should look to Title VII’s definition of 
discrimination, which speaks of it as disparate treatment relating to compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, how can it seriously be argued that the “ultimate 
employment decision” test is dictated by Title VII? In other words, the wording of Title VII in 
this regard suggests liability for actions that have less than an “ultimate” effect. The use of the 
words “condition,” “privilege,” and “term” all connote a less fundamental component of 
employment than hiring, firing, or demotion.  
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Court, in its holding, ignored the apparent incongruity of their 
reference to Title VII’s discrimination definition as support for their 
position that only ultimate employment decisions are cognizable 
under section 704.155 
IV. THE PROPOSAL 
The intermediate position, which requires that an action be 
“materially adverse”156 in order to constitute an “adverse employment 
action” should be adopted by all circuits as the standard for this 
element of the prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII.157 This 
standard, as utilized by both the Second and Third Circuits,158 is firm 
but flexible; it eliminates trivial cases and allows the court to respond 
to fact-specific nuances of the particular case at bar.159 Moreover, the 
standard effectuates the purpose of the retaliation provision to 
maintain unfettered access to the remedial mechanisms of Title 
VII.160 Lastly, the standard appears to comport with a recent Supreme 
Court decision which advocates a similar approach in closely related 
Title VII context.161 
First, circuits should adopt “materially adverse” action because it 
is a flexible, but firm standard. Unlike the broad position which is 
vague and hard to apply, and the restrictive position which is easy to 
 
 155. See supra note 153. 
 156. This test has alternately been described as requiring “materially adverse change.” See 
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997). It is also described as having a “materially 
adverse affect [on employment conditions].” See supra note 19. Moreover, this test was also 
characterized as having a “materially adverse employment action.” See Robinson v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997). This author agrees with the EEOC in its 
criticism of “materially adverse affect” as focusing too closely on matters that should pertain to 
damages, not liability. See supra note 19 (“More significant retaliatory treatment however, can 
be challenged regardless of the level of harm.”). 
 157. See supra text accompanying note 4 (listing elements of the prima facie case).  
 158. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 
F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 159. Presumably, this standard would occur because trivial matters would not be 
considered “material,” and yet, the court is free to determine what is “material” in a given 
factual circumstance. Because what constitutes a material employment action in one office may 
not be so in another, the court needs a flexible standard to make these determinations. 
 160. Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (the primary purpose of the anti-
retaliation provision is “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”). 
 161. Burlington Induss., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (using “tangible employment 
action” as a standard in a quid pro quo harassment case). 
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apply but rigid in its application, the intermediate position is easy to 
understand and adaptable to changing factual contexts.162 For 
example, in a hypothetical situation in which an employer transfers 
an employee within the employer’s company, following that 
employee’s participation in a protected activity, only the “materially 
adverse” standard allows a court the clarity and flexibility to reach a 
just result. Under the broad test, a transfer, with a few limited 
exceptions, would always constitute an adverse employment 
action.163 Under the restrictive test a transfer would never constitute 
an adverse employment action because it could not rise to the level of 
an “ultimate employment decision.”164 Under the “materially 
adverse” standard, however, the court would be given the flexibility 
to consider a number of factors and determine whether the presence 
or absence of these factors constitutes a “materially adverse” action 
to the particular plaintiff under his or her particular circumstances.165  
In addition to flexibility, the materially adverse standard 
effectuates the purpose of Title VII’s retaliation provision. This 
purpose is to shield the employee from retaliation, when the 
employee chooses to take advantage of Title VII to protect his rights 
in the workplace.166 Although the statute clearly struck a balance in 
favor of the employee, employers’ interests have to be considered as 
well. Therefore, the broad standard, which on its face is potentially 
 
 162. One court that employed the “materially adverse change” standard explained the test 
as follows:  
[A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment must be 
more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A 
materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a 
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a 
material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other 
indices that might be unique to a particular situation. 
Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993), cited in Rabinovitz 
v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 163. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing with approval 
other Ninth Circuit cases holding that a lateral transfer constitutes an adverse employment 
action under the Circuit’s broad position). 
 164. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak, 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (defining ultimate 
employment action as “acts such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and 
compensating”). 
 165. Such factors in this hypothetical might include the employer’s interests in a collegial 
atmosphere in the workplace and the employee’s interest in remaining at a particular office.  
 
 166. See Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969).  
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more apt to protect an employee invoking Title VII, goes too far in its 
application.167 The “materially adverse” standard, to the contrary, 
protects employers from trivial claims, but still leaves employees 
with “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”168 Any 
employer action that prevents, is intended to prevent, or could 
potentially prevent an employee from participating in an EEOC 
investigation or complaint would be considered “material” by any 
reasonable court that applies this standard.  
Finally, although the Supreme Court has not addressed 
specifically the issue of what constitutes an adverse employment 
decision, the Court has alluded to a standard similar to the “materially 
adverse” criterion. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth169 involved a 
quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claim 
under Title VII. The Supreme Court discussed “tangible employment 
actions” to determine a standard to apply to employer liability for 
harassment by fellow employees.170 When it defined “tangible 
employment action” the Supreme Court referred to “significant 
changes” in various aspects of one’s employment.171 Tangible actions 
that cause significant changes in one’s employment would almost 
always be considered “materially adverse” to the employee. Thus, in 
this similar context, the Supreme Court advocated a standard that 
 
 167. Another problem with the considerable scope of the broad position is that it leaves 
employers potentially open for frivolous harassment suits. If there is a low threshold for 
establishing a prima facie case, it will be harder for employers to dispose of meritless claims on 
summary judgment. Thus, an employer will be forced to either settle the claim, or face 
expensive litigation. This choice, of course, has broader societal implications if businesses pass 
on the high costs of litigation to consumers. 
 168. See supra note 159. 
 169. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 170. The Ellerth case dealt with a supervisor that threatened to take certain employment 
actions against a female employee if that employee did not succumb to his sexual advances. Id. 
at 747-48. The precise question before the Court was, “whether an employer has vicarious 
liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work environment by making explicit threats to 
alter a subordinate’s terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill the 
threat.” Id. at 754. After it framed the precise issue, the Court declared that a “uniform and 
predictable standard must be established as a matter of federal law.” Id. In response to this self-
appointed task of adopting a standard, the Court decided on “tangible employment action.” Id. 
at 760-62. 
 171. Id. at 761 (“A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”). 
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facially excludes minor matters from litigation, but leaves much room 
for actions that fall short of ultimate employment decisions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
All federal circuits should adopt the “materially adverse” standard 
of liability when they construe the judicially-created “adverse 
employment action” as an element of the prima facie case of Title VII 
retaliation. The present alternatives, a broad, ambiguous standard and 
a narrow, restrictive “ultimate employment decision” test, both fail to 
strike an adequate balance between the competing interests of the 
employee and employer in a Title VII action. Accordingly, the 
“materially adverse” test currently stands as the only fair, balanced 
approach to determine what constitutes an “adverse employment 
action” in Title VII retaliation cases. 
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